Network Working Group                                         J. Yasskin
Internet-Draft                                                    Google
Intended status: Standards Track                           19 April 2024
Expires: 21 October 2024


                         Signed HTTP Exchanges
           draft-yasskin-http-origin-signed-responses-latest

Abstract

   This document specifies how a server can send an HTTP exchange---a
   request URL, content negotiation information, and a response---with
   signatures that vouch for that exchange's authenticity.  These
   signatures can be verified against an origin's certificate to
   establish that the exchange is authoritative for an origin even if it
   was transferred over a connection that isn't.  The signatures can
   also be used in other ways described in the appendices.

   These signatures contain countermeasures against downgrade and
   protocol-confusion attacks.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the WPACK Working Group
   mailing list (wpack@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/wpack/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/WICG/webpackage.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 October 2024.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
   2.  Terminology
   3.  Signing an exchange
     3.1.  The Signature Header
       3.1.1.  Examples
       3.1.2.  Open Questions
     3.2.  CBOR representation of exchange response headers
       3.2.1.  Example
     3.3.  Loading a certificate chain
     3.4.  Canonical CBOR serialization
     3.5.  Signature validity
       3.5.1.  Open Questions
     3.6.  Updating signature validity
       3.6.1.  Examples
     3.7.  The Accept-Signature header
       3.7.1.  Integrity identifiers
       3.7.2.  Key type identifiers
       3.7.3.  Key value identifiers
       3.7.4.  Examples
       3.7.5.  Open Questions
   4.  Cross-origin trust
     4.1.  Uncached header fields
       4.1.1.  Stateful header fields
     4.2.  Certificate Requirements
       4.2.1.  Extensions to the CAA Record: cansignhttpexchanges
               Parameter
   5.  Transferring a signed exchange
     5.1.  Same-origin response
       5.1.1.  Serialized headers for a same-origin response
       5.1.2.  The Signed-Headers Header
     5.2.  HTTP/2 extension for cross-origin Server Push
       5.2.1.  Indicating support for cross-origin Server Push
       5.2.2.  NO_TRUSTED_EXCHANGE_SIGNATURE error code
       5.2.3.  Validating a cross-origin Push
     5.3.  application/signed-exchange format
       5.3.1.  Cross-origin trust in application/signed-exchange
       5.3.2.  Example
       5.3.3.  Open Questions
   6.  Security considerations
     6.1.  Over-signing
       6.1.1.  Session fixation
       6.1.2.  Misleading content
     6.2.  Off-path attackers
       6.2.1.  Mis-issued certificates
       6.2.2.  Stolen private keys
     6.3.  Downgrades
     6.4.  Signing oracles are permanent
     6.5.  Unsigned headers
     6.6.  application/signed-exchange
     6.7.  Key re-use with TLS
     6.8.  Content sniffing
   7.  Privacy considerations
     7.1.  Visibility of resource requests
     7.2.  User ID transfer
   8.  IANA considerations
     8.1.  Signature Header Field Registration
     8.2.  Accept-Signature Header Field Registration
     8.3.  Signed-Headers Header Field Registration
     8.4.  HTTP/2 Settings
     8.5.  HTTP/2 Error code
     8.6.  Internet Media Type application/signed-exchange
     8.7.  Internet Media Type application/cert-chain+cbor
     8.8.  The cansignhttpexchanges CAA Parameter
   9.  References
     9.1.  Normative References
     9.2.  Informative References
   Appendix A.  Use cases
     A.1.  PUSHed subresources
     A.2.  Explicit use of a content distributor for subresources
     A.3.  Subresource Integrity
     A.4.  Binary Transparency
     A.5.  Static Analysis
     A.6.  Offline websites
   Appendix B.  Requirements
     B.1.  Proof of origin
       B.1.1.  Certificate constraints
       B.1.2.  Signature constraints
       B.1.3.  Retrieving the certificate
     B.2.  How much to sign
       B.2.1.  Conveying the signed headers
     B.3.  Response lifespan
       B.3.1.  Certificate revocation
       B.3.2.  Response downgrade attacks
     B.4.  Low implementation complexity
       B.4.1.  Limited choices
       B.4.2.  Bounded-buffering integrity checking
   Appendix C.  Determining validity using cache control
     C.1.  Example of updating cache control
     C.2.  Downsides of updating cache control
   Appendix D.  Change Log
   Appendix E.  Acknowledgements
   Author's Address

1.  Introduction

   Signed HTTP exchanges provide a way to prove the authenticity of a
   resource in cases where the transport layer isn't sufficient.  This
   can be used in several ways:

   *  When signed by a certificate ([RFC5280]) that's trusted for an
      origin, an exchange can be treated as authoritative for that
      origin, even if it was transferred over a connection that isn't
      authoritative (Section 9.1 of [RFC7230]) for that origin.  See
      Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2.

   *  A top-level resource can use a public key to identify an expected
      publisher for particular subresources, a system known as
      Subresource Integrity ([SRI]).  An exchange's signature provides
      the matching proof of authorship.  See Appendix A.3.

   *  A signature can vouch for the exchange in some way, for example
      that it appears in a transparency log or that static analysis
      indicates that it omits certain attacks.  See Appendix A.4 and
      Appendix A.5.

   Subsequent work toward the use cases in [I-D.yasskin-wpack-use-cases]
   will provide a way to group signed exchanges into bundles that can be
   transmitted and stored together, but single signed exchanges are
   useful enough to standardize on their own.

2.  Terminology

   Absolute URL  A string for which the URL parser
      (https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-url-parser) ([URL]), when
      run without a base URL, returns a URL rather than a failure, and
      for which that URL has a null fragment.  This is similar to the
      absolute-URL string (https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#absolute-url-
      string) concept defined by ([URL]) but might not include exactly
      the same strings.

   Author  The entity that wrote the content in a particular resource.
      This specification deals with publishers rather than authors.

   Publisher  The entity that controls the server for a particular
      origin [RFC6454].  The publisher can get a CA to issue
      certificates for their private keys and can run a TLS server for
      their origin.

   Exchange (noun)  An HTTP request URL, content negotiation
      information, and an HTTP response.  This can be encoded into a
      request message from a client with its matching response from a
      server, into the request in a PUSH_PROMISE with its matching
      response stream, or into the dedicated format in Section 5.3,
      which uses [I-D.ietf-httpbis-variants] to encode the content
      negotiation information.  This is not quite the same meaning as
      defined by Section 8 of [RFC7540], which assumes the content
      negotiation information is embedded into HTTP request headers.

   Intermediate  An entity that fetches signed HTTP exchanges from a
      publisher or another intermediate and forwards them to another
      intermediate or a client.

   Client  An entity that uses a signed HTTP exchange and needs to be
      able to prove that the publisher vouched for it as coming from its
      claimed origin.

   Unix time  Defined by [POSIX] section 4.16
      (http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/
      V1_chap04.html#tag_04_16).

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Signing an exchange

   In the response of an HTTP exchange the server MAY include a
   Signature header field (Section 3.1) holding a list of one or more
   parameterised signatures that vouch for the content of the exchange.
   Exactly which content the signature vouches for can depend on how the
   exchange is transferred (Section 5).

   The client categorizes each signature as "valid" or "invalid" by
   validating that signature with its certificate or public key and
   other metadata against the exchange's URL, response headers, and
   content (Section 3.5).  This validity then informs higher-level
   protocols.

   Each signature is parameterised with information to let a client
   fetch assurance that a signed exchange is still valid, in the face of
   revoked certificates and newly-discovered vulnerabilities.  This
   assurance can be bundled back into the signed exchange and forwarded
   to another client, which won't have to re-fetch this validity
   information for some period of time.

3.1.  The Signature Header

   The Signature header field conveys a list of signatures for an
   exchange, each one accompanied by information about how to determine
   the authority of and refresh that signature.  Each signature directly
   signs the exchange's URL and response headers and identifies one of
   those headers that enforces the integrity of the exchange's payload.

   The Signature header is a Structured Header as defined by
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure].  Its value MUST be a
   parameterised list (Section 3.4 of
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]).  Its ABNF is:

   Signature = sh-param-list

   Each parameterised identifier in the list MUST have parameters named
   "sig", "integrity", "validity-url", "date", and "expires".  Each
   parameterised identifier MUST also have either "cert-url" and "cert-
   sha256" parameters or an "ed25519key" parameter.  This specification
   gives no meaning to the identifier itself, which can be used as a
   human-readable identifier for the signature (however, this is likely
   to change soon; see Section 3.1.2, Paragraph 1).  The present
   parameters MUST have the following values:

   "sig"  Byte sequence (Section 3.10 of
      [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]) holding the signature of most
      of these parameters and the exchange's URL and response headers.

   "integrity"  A string (Section 3.8 of
      [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]) containing a "/"-separated
      sequence of names starting with the lowercase name of the response
      header field that guards the response payload's integrity.  The
      meaning of subsequent names depends on the response header field,
      but for the "digest" header field, the single following name is
      the name of the digest algorithm that guards the payload's
      integrity.

   "cert-url"  A string (Section 3.8 of
      [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]) containing an absolute URL
      (Section 2) with a scheme of "https" or "data".

   "cert-sha256"  Byte sequence (Section 3.10 of
      [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]) holding the SHA-256 hash of
      the first certificate found at "cert-url".

   "ed25519key"  Byte sequence (Section 3.10 of
      [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]) holding an Ed25519 public key
      ([RFC8032]).

   "validity-url"  A string (Section 3.8 of
      [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]) containing an absolute URL
      (Section 2) with a scheme of "https".

   "date" and "expires"  An integer (Section 3.6 of
      [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]) representing a Unix time.

   The "cert-url" parameter is _not_ signed, so intermediates can update
   it with a pointer to a cached version.

3.1.1.  Examples

   The following header is included in the response for an exchange with
   effective request URI https://example.com/resource.html.  Newlines
   are added for readability.

   Signature:
    sig1;
     sig=*MEUCIQDXlI2gN3RNBlgFiuRNFpZXcDIaUpX6HIEwcZEc0cZYLAIga9DsVOMM+g5YpwEBdGW3sS+bvnmAJJiSMwhuBdqp5UY=*;
     integrity="digest/mi-sha256";
     validity-url="https://example.com/resource.validity.1511128380";
     cert-url="https://example.com/oldcerts";
     cert-sha256=*W7uB969dFW3Mb5ZefPS9Tq5ZbH5iSmOILpjv2qEArmI=*;
     date=1511128380; expires=1511733180,
    sig2;
     sig=*MEQCIGjZRqTRf9iKNkGFyzRMTFgwf/BrY2ZNIP/dykhUV0aYAiBTXg+8wujoT4n/W+cNgb7pGqQvIUGYZ8u8HZJ5YH26Qg==*;
     integrity="digest/mi-sha256";
     validity-url="https://example.com/resource.validity.1511128380";
     cert-url="https://example.com/newcerts";
     cert-sha256=*J/lEm9kNRODdCmINbvitpvdYKNQ+YgBj99DlYp4fEXw=*;
     date=1511128380; expires=1511733180,
    srisig;
     sig=*lGZVaJJM5f2oGczFlLmBdKTDL+QADza4BgeO494ggACYJOvrof6uh5OJCcwKrk7DK+LBch0jssDYPp5CLc1SDA==*;
     integrity="digest/mi-sha256";
     validity-url="https://example.com/resource.validity.1511128380";
     ed25519key=*zsSevyFsxyZHiUluVBDd4eypdRLTqyWRVOJuuKUz+A8=*
     date=1511128380; expires=1511733180,
    thirdpartysig;
     sig=*MEYCIQCNxJzn6Rh2fNxsobktir8TkiaJYQFhWTuWI1i4PewQaQIhAMs2TVjc4rTshDtXbgQEOwgj2mRXALhfXPztXgPupii+*;
     integrity="digest/mi-sha256";
     validity-url="https://thirdparty.example.com/resource.validity.1511161860";
     cert-url="https://thirdparty.example.com/certs";
     cert-sha256=*UeOwUPkvxlGRTyvHcsMUN0A2oNsZbU8EUvg8A9ZAnNc=*;
     date=1511133060; expires=1511478660,

   There are 4 signatures: 2 from different secp256r1 certificates
   within https://example.com/, one using a raw ed25519 public key
   that's also controlled by example.com, and a fourth using a secp256r1
   certificate owned by thirdparty.example.com.

   All 4 signatures rely on the Digest response header with the mi-
   sha256 digest algorithm to guard the integrity of the response
   payload.

   The signatures include a "validity-url" that includes the first time
   the resource was seen.  This allows multiple versions of a resource
   at the same URL to be updated with new signatures, which allows
   clients to avoid transferring extra data while the old versions don't
   have known security bugs.

   The certificates at https://example.com/oldcerts and
   https://example.com/newcerts have subjectAltNames of example.com,
   meaning that if they and their signatures validate, the exchange can
   be trusted as having an origin of https://example.com/. The publisher
   might be using two certificates because their readers have disjoint
   sets of roots in their trust stores.

   The publisher signed with all three certificates at the same time, so
   they share a validity range: 7 days starting at 2017-11-19 21:53 UTC.

   The publisher then requested an additional signature from
   thirdparty.example.com, which did some validation or processing and
   then signed the resource at 2017-11-19 23:11 UTC.
   thirdparty.example.com only grants 4-day signatures, so clients will
   need to re-validate more often.

3.1.2.  Open Questions

   The next revision of [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure] will provide
   a way to parameterise byte sequences, at which point the signature
   itself is likely to become the main list item.

   Should the cert-url and validity-url be lists so that intermediates
   can offer a cache without losing the original URLs?  Putting lists in
   dictionary fields is more complex than
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure] allows, so they're single items
   for now.

3.2.  CBOR representation of exchange response headers

   To sign an exchange's response headers, they need to be serialized
   into a byte string.  Since intermediaries and distributors
   (Appendix A.2) might rearrange, add, or just reserialize headers, we
   can't use the literal bytes of the headers as this serialization.
   Instead, this section defines a CBOR representation that can be
   embedded into other CBOR, canonically serialized (Section 3.4), and
   then signed.

   The CBOR representation of a set of response metadata and headers is
   the CBOR ([RFC7049]) map with the following mappings:

   *  The byte string ':status' to the byte string containing the
      response's 3-digit status code, and

   *  For each response header field, the header field's lowercase name
      as a byte string to the header field's value as a byte string.

3.2.1.  Example

   Given the HTTP exchange:

   GET / HTTP/1.1
   Host: example.com
   Accept: */*

   HTTP/1.1 200
   Content-Type: text/html
   Digest: mi-sha256=dcRDgR2GM35DluAV13PzgnG6+pvQwPywfFvAu1UeFrs=
   Signed-Headers: "content-type", "digest"

   <!doctype html>
   <html>
   ...

   The cbor representation consists of the following item, represented
   using the extended diagnostic notation from [CDDL] appendix G:

   {
     'digest': 'mi-sha256=dcRDgR2GM35DluAV13PzgnG6+pvQwPywfFvAu1UeFrs=',
     ':status': '200',
     'content-type': 'text/html'
   }

3.3.  Loading a certificate chain

   The resource at a signature's cert-url MUST have the application/
   cert-chain+cbor content type, MUST be canonically-encoded CBOR
   (Section 3.4), and MUST match the following CDDL:

   cert-chain = [
     "📜⛓", ; U+1F4DC U+26D3
     + augmented-certificate
   ]
   augmented-certificate = {
     cert: bytes,
     ? ocsp: bytes,
     ? sct: bytes,
     * tstr => any,
   }

   The first map (second item) in the CBOR array is treated as the end-
   entity certificate, and the client will attempt to build a path
   ([RFC5280]) to it from a trusted root using the other certificates in
   the chain.

   1.  Each cert value MUST be a DER-encoded X.509v3 certificate
       ([RFC5280]).  Other key/value pairs in the same array item define
       properties of this certificate.

   2.  The first certificate's ocsp value MUST be a complete, DER-
       encoded OCSP response for that certificate (using the ASN.1 type
       OCSPResponse defined in [RFC6960]).  Subsequent certificates MUST
       NOT have an ocsp value.

   3.  Each certificate's sct value if any MUST be a
       SignedCertificateTimestampList for that certificate as defined by
       Section 3.3 of [RFC6962].

   Loading a cert-url takes a forceFetch flag.  The client MUST:

   1.  Let raw-chain be the result of fetching ([FETCH]) cert-url.  If
       forceFetch is _not_ set, the fetch can be fulfilled from a cache
       using normal HTTP semantics [RFC7234].  If this fetch fails,
       return "invalid".

   2.  Let certificate-chain be the array of certificates and properties
       produced by parsing raw-chain using the CDDL above.  If any of
       the requirements above aren't satisfied, return "invalid".  Note
       that this validation requirement might be impractical to
       completely achieve due to certificate validation implementations
       that don't enforce DER encoding or other standard constraints.

   3.  Return certificate-chain.

3.4.  Canonical CBOR serialization

   Within this specification, the canonical serialization of a CBOR item
   uses the following rules derived from Section 3.9 of [RFC7049] with
   erratum 4964 applied:

   *  Integers and the lengths of arrays, maps, and strings MUST use the
      smallest possible encoding.

   *  Items MUST NOT be encoded with indefinite length.

   *  The keys in every map MUST be sorted in the bytewise lexicographic
      order of their canonical encodings.  For example, the following
      keys are correctly sorted:

      1.  10, encoded as 0A.

      2.  100, encoded as 18 64.

      3.  -1, encoded as 20.

      4.  "z", encoded as 61 7A.

      5.  "aa", encoded as 62 61 61.

      6.  [100], encoded as 81 18 64.

      7.  [-1], encoded as 81 20.

      8.  false, encoded as F4.

   Note: this specification does not use floating point, tags, or other
   more complex data types, so it doesn't need rules to canonicalize
   those.

3.5.  Signature validity

   The client MUST parse the Signature header field as the parameterised
   list (Section 4.2.5 of [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]) described
   in Section 3.1.  If an error is thrown during this parsing or any of
   the requirements described there aren't satisfied, the exchange has
   no valid signatures.  Otherwise, each member of this list represents
   a signature with parameters.

   The client MUST use the following algorithm to determine whether each
   signature with parameters is invalid or potentially-valid for an
   exchange's

   *  requestUrl, a byte sequence that can be parsed into the exchange's
      effective request URI (Section 5.5 of [RFC7230]),

   *  responseHeaders, a byte sequence holding the canonical
      serialization (Section 3.4) of the CBOR representation
      (Section 3.2) of the exchange's response metadata and headers, and

   *  payload, a stream of bytes constituting the exchange's payload
      body (Section 3.3 of [RFC7230]).  Note that the payload body is
      the message body with any transfer encodings removed.

   Potentially-valid results include:

   *  The signed headers of the exchange so that higher-level protocols
      can avoid relying on unsigned headers, and

   *  Either a certificate chain or a public key so that a higher-level
      protocol can determine whether it's actually valid.

   This algorithm accepts a forceFetch flag that avoids the cache when
   fetching URLs.  A client that determines that a potentially-valid
   certificate chain is actually invalid due to an expired OCSP response
   MAY retry with forceFetch set to retrieve an updated OCSP from the
   original server.

   1.   Let:

        *  signature be the signature (byte sequence in the
           parameterised identifier's "sig" parameter).

        *  integrity be the signature's "integrity" parameter.

        *  validity-url be the signature's "validity-url" parameter.

        *  cert-url be the signature's "cert-url" parameter, if any.

        *  cert-sha256 be the signature's "cert-sha256" parameter, if
           any.

        *  ed25519key be the signature's "ed25519key" parameter, if any.

        *  date be the signature's "date" parameter, interpreted as a
           Unix time.

        *  expires be the signature's "expires" parameter, interpreted
           as a Unix time.

   2.   Set publicKey and signing-alg depending on which key fields are
        present:

        1.  If cert-url is present:

            1.  Let certificate-chain be the result of loading the
                certificate chain at cert-url passing the forceFetch
                flag (Section 3.3).  If this returns "invalid", return
                "invalid".

            2.  Let main-certificate be the first certificate in
                certificate-chain.

            3.  Set publicKey to main-certificate's public key.

            4.  If publicKey is an RSA key, return "invalid".

            5.  If publicKey is a key using the secp256r1 elliptic
                curve, set signing-alg to ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 as
                defined in Section 4.2.3 of [RFC8446].

            6.  Otherwise, either return "invalid" or set signing-alg to
                a non-legacy signing algorithm defined by TLS 1.3 or
                later ([RFC8446]).  This choice MUST depend only on
                publicKey's type and not on any other context.

        2.  If ed25519key is present, set publicKey to ed25519key and
            signing-alg to ed25519, as defined by [RFC8032]

   3.   If expires is more than 7 days (604800 seconds) after date,
        return "invalid".

   4.   If the current time is before date or after expires, return
        "invalid".

   5.   Let message be the concatenation of the following byte strings.
        This matches the [RFC8446] format to avoid cross-protocol
        attacks if anyone uses the same key in a TLS certificate and an
        exchange-signing certificate.

        1.  A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times.

        2.  A context string: the ASCII encoding of "HTTP Exchange 1".

            Note: RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS NOTE; The implementation
            of the final RFC MUST use this context string, but
            implementations of drafts MUST NOT use it and MUST use
            another draft-specific string beginning with "HTTP Exchange
            1 ” instead.  This ensures that signers can predict how
            their signatures will be used.

        3.  A single 0 byte which serves as a separator.

        4.  If cert-sha256 is set, a byte holding the value 32 followed
            by the 32 bytes of the value of cert-sha256.  Otherwise a 0
            byte.

        5.  The 8-byte big-endian encoding of the length in bytes of
            validity-url, followed by the bytes of validity-url.

        6.  The 8-byte big-endian encoding of date.

        7.  The 8-byte big-endian encoding of expires.

        8.  The 8-byte big-endian encoding of the length in bytes of
            requestUrl, followed by the bytes of requestUrl.

        9.  The 8-byte big-endian encoding of the length in bytes of
            responseHeaders, followed by the bytes of responseHeaders.

   6.   If cert-url is present and the SHA-256 hash of main-
        certificate's cert_data is not equal to cert-sha256 (whose
        presence was checked when the Signature header field was
        parsed), return "invalid".

        Note that this intentionally differs from TLS 1.3, which signs
        the entire certificate chain in its Certificate Verify
        (Section 4.4.3 of [RFC8446]), in order to allow updating the
        stapled OCSP response without updating signatures at the same
        time.

   7.   If signature is not a valid signature of message by publicKey
        using signing-alg, return "invalid".

   8.   If headers, interpreted according to Section 3.2, does not
        contain a Content-Type response header field (Section 3.1.1.5 of
        [RFC7231]), return "invalid".

        Clients MUST interpret the signed payload as this specified
        media type instead of trying to sniff a media type from the
        bytes of the payload, for example by attaching an X-Content-
        Type-Options: nosniff header field ([FETCH]) to the extracted
        response.

   9.   If integrity names a header field and parameter that is not
        present in responseHeaders or which the client cannot use to
        check the integrity of payload (for example, the header field is
        new and hasn't been implemented yet), then return "invalid".  If
        the selected header field provides integrity guarantees weaker
        than SHA-256, return "invalid".  If validating integrity using
        the selected header field requires the client to process records
        larger than 16384 bytes, return "invalid".  Clients MUST
        implement at least the Digest header field with its mi-sha256
        digest algorithm (Section 3 of [I-D.thomson-http-mice]).

        Note: RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS NOTE; Implementations of
        drafts of this RFC MUST recognize the draft spelling of the
        content encoding and digest algorithm specified by
        [I-D.thomson-http-mice] until that draft is published as an RFC.
        For example, implementations of draft-thomson-http-mice-03 would
        use mi-sha256-03 and MUST NOT use mi-sha256 itself.  This
        ensures that final implementations don't need to handle
        compatibility with implementations of early drafts of that
        content encoding.

        If payload doesn't match the integrity information in the header
        described by integrity, return "invalid".

   10.  Return "potentially-valid" with whichever is present of
        certificate-chain or ed25519key.

   Note that the above algorithm can determine that an exchange's
   headers are potentially-valid before the exchange's payload is
   received.  Similarly, if integrity identifies a header field and
   parameter like Digest:mi-sha256 ([I-D.thomson-http-mice]) that can
   incrementally validate the payload, early parts of the payload can be
   determined to be potentially-valid before later parts of the payload.
   Higher-level protocols MAY process parts of the exchange that have
   been determined to be potentially-valid as soon as that determination
   is made but MUST NOT process parts of the exchange that are not yet
   potentially-valid.  Similarly, as the higher-level protocol
   determines that parts of the exchange are actually valid, the client
   MAY process those parts of the exchange and MUST wait to process
   other parts of the exchange until they too are determined to be
   valid.

3.5.1.  Open Questions

   Should the signed message use the TLS format (with an initial 64
   spaces) even though these certificates can't be used in TLS servers?

3.6.  Updating signature validity

   Both OCSP responses and signatures are designed to expire a short
   time after they're signed, so that revoked certificates and signed
   exchanges with known vulnerabilities are distrusted promptly.

   This specification provides no way to update OCSP responses by
   themselves.  Instead, clients need to re-fetch the "cert-url"
   (Section 3.5, Paragraph 6) to get a chain including a newer OCSP
   response.

   The "validity-url" parameter (Section 3.1) of the signatures provides
   a way to fetch new signatures or learn where to fetch a complete
   updated exchange.

   Each version of a signed exchange SHOULD have its own validity URLs,
   since each version needs different signatures and becomes obsolete at
   different times.

   The resource at a "validity-url" is "validity data", a CBOR map
   matching the following CDDL ([CDDL]):

   validity = {
     ? signatures: [ + bytes ]
     ? update: {
       ? size: uint,
     }
   ]

   The elements of the signatures array are parameterised identifiers
   (Section 4.2.6 of [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]) meant to
   replace the signatures within the Signature header field pointing to
   this validity data.  If the signed exchange contains a bug severe
   enough that clients need to stop using the content, the signatures
   array MUST NOT be present.

   If the the update map is present, that indicates that a new version
   of the signed exchange is available at its effective request URI
   (Section 5.5 of [RFC7230]) and can give an estimate of the size of
   the updated exchange (update.size).  If the signed exchange is
   currently the most recent version, the update SHOULD NOT be present.

   If both the signatures and update fields are present, clients can use
   the estimated size to decide whether to update the whole resource or
   just its signatures.

3.6.1.  Examples

   For example, say a signed exchange whose URL is https://example.com/
   resource has the following Signature header field (with line breaks
   included and irrelevant fields omitted for ease of reading).

   Signature:
    sig1;
     sig=*MEUCIQ...*;
     ...
     validity-url="https://example.com/resource.validity.1511157180";
     cert-url="https://example.com/oldcerts";
     date=1511128380; expires=1511733180,
    sig2;
     sig=*MEQCIG...*;
     ...
     validity-url="https://example.com/resource.validity.1511157180";
     cert-url="https://example.com/newcerts";
     date=1511128380; expires=1511733180,
    thirdpartysig;
     sig=*MEYCIQ...*;
     ...
     validity-url="https://thirdparty.example.com/resource.validity.1511161860";
     cert-url="https://thirdparty.example.com/certs";
     date=1511478660; expires=1511824260

   At 2017-11-27 11:02 UTC, sig1 and sig2 have expired, but
   thirdpartysig doesn't exipire until 23:11 that night, so the client
   needs to fetch https://example.com/resource.validity.1511157180 (the
   validity-url of sig1 and sig2) if it wishes to update those
   signatures.  This URL might contain:

   {
     "signatures": [
       'sig1; '
       'sig=*MEQCIC/I9Q+7BZFP6cSDsWx43pBAL0ujTbON/+7RwKVk+ba5AiB3FSFLZqpzmDJ0NumNwN04pqgJZE99fcK86UjkPbj4jw==*; '
       'validity-url="https://example.com/resource.validity.1511157180"; '
       'integrity="digest/mi-sha256"; '
       'cert-url="https://example.com/newcerts"; '
       'cert-sha256=*J/lEm9kNRODdCmINbvitpvdYKNQ+YgBj99DlYp4fEXw=*; '
       'date=1511733180; expires=1512337980'
     ],
     "update": {
       "size": 5557452
     }
   }

   This indicates that the client could fetch a newer version at
   https://example.com/resource (the original URL of the exchange), or
   that the validity period of the old version can be extended by
   replacing the first two of the original signatures (the ones with a
   validity-url of https://example.com/resource.validity.1511157180)
   with the single new signature provided.  (This might happen at the
   end of a migration to a new root certificate.)  The signatures of the
   updated signed exchange would be:

   Signature:
    sig1;
     sig=*MEQCIC...*;
     ...
     validity-url="https://example.com/resource.validity.1511157180";
     cert-url="https://example.com/newcerts";
     date=1511733180; expires=1512337980,
    thirdpartysig;
     sig=*MEYCIQ...*;
     ...
     validity-url="https://thirdparty.example.com/resource.validity.1511161860";
     cert-url="https://thirdparty.example.com/certs";
     date=1511478660; expires=1511824260

   https://example.com/resource.validity.1511157180 could also expand
   the set of signatures if its signatures array contained more than 2
   elements.

3.7.  The Accept-Signature header

   Signature header fields cost on the order of 300 bytes for ECDSA
   signatures, so servers might prefer to avoid sending them to clients
   that don't intend to use them.  A client can send the Accept-
   Signature header field to indicate that it does intend to take
   advantage of any available signatures and to indicate what kinds of
   signatures it supports.

   When a server receives an Accept-Signature header field in a client
   request, it SHOULD reply with any available Signature header fields
   for its response that the Accept-Signature header field indicates the
   client supports.  However, if the Accept-Signature value violates a
   requirement in this section, the server MUST behave as if it hadn't
   received any Accept-Signature header at all.

   The Accept-Signature header field is a Structured Header as defined
   by [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure].  Its value MUST be a
   parameterised list (Section 3.4 of
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]).  Its ABNF is:

   Accept-Signature = sh-param-list

   The order of identifiers in the Accept-Signature list is not
   significant.  Identifiers, ignoring any initial "-" character, MUST
   NOT be duplicated.

   Each identifier in the Accept-Signature header field's value
   indicates that a feature of the Signature header field (Section 3.1)
   is supported.  If the identifier begins with a "-" character, it
   instead indicates that the feature named by the rest of the
   identifier is not supported.  Unknown identifiers and parameters MUST
   be ignored because new identifiers and new parameters on existing
   identifiers may be defined by future specifications.

3.7.1.  Integrity identifiers

   Identifiers starting with "digest/" indicate that the client supports
   the Digest header field ([RFC3230]) with the parameter from the HTTP
   Digest Algorithm Values Registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/
   http-dig-alg/http-dig-alg.xhtml) registry named in lower-case by the
   rest of the identifier.  For example, "digest/mi-blake2" indicates
   support for Merkle integrity with the as-yet-unspecified mi-blake2
   parameter, and "-digest/mi-sha256" indicates non-support for Merkle
   integrity with the mi-sha256 content encoding.

   If the Accept-Signature header field is present, servers SHOULD
   assume support for "digest/mi-sha256" unless the header field states
   otherwise.

3.7.2.  Key type identifiers

   Identifiers starting with "ecdsa/" indicate that the client supports
   certificates holding ECDSA public keys on the curve named in lower-
   case by the rest of the identifier.

   If the Accept-Signature header field is present, servers SHOULD
   assume support for "ecdsa/secp256r1" unless the header field states
   otherwise.

3.7.3.  Key value identifiers

   The "ed25519key" identifier has parameters indicating the public keys
   that will be used to validate the returned signature.  Each
   parameter's name is re-interpreted as a byte sequence (Section 3.10
   of [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]) encoding a prefix of the
   public key.  For example, if the client will validate signatures
   using the public key whose base64 encoding is
   11qYAYKxCrfVS/7TyWQHOg7hcvPapiMlrwIaaPcHURo=, valid Accept-Signature
   header fields include:

   Accept-Signature: ..., ed25519key; *11qYAYKxCrfVS/7TyWQHOg7hcvPapiMlrwIaaPcHURo=*
   Accept-Signature: ..., ed25519key; *11qYAYKxCrfVS/7TyWQHOg==*
   Accept-Signature: ..., ed25519key; *11qYAQ==*
   Accept-Signature: ..., ed25519key; **

   but not

   Accept-Signature: ..., ed25519key; *11qYA===*

   because 5 bytes isn't a valid length for encoded base64, and not

   Accept-Signature: ..., ed25519key; 11qYAQ

   because it doesn't start or end with the *s that indicate a byte
   sequence.

   Note that ed25519key; ** is an empty prefix, which matches all public
   keys, so it's useful in subresource integrity (Appendix A.3) cases
   like <link rel=preload as=script href="..."> where the public key
   isn't known until the matching <script src="..." integrity="...">
   tag.

3.7.4.  Examples

   Accept-Signature: digest/mi-sha256

   states that the client will accept signatures with payload integrity
   assured by the Digest header and mi-sha256 digest algorithm and
   implies that the client will accept signatures from ECDSA keys on the
   secp256r1 curve.

   Accept-Signature: -ecdsa/secp256r1, ecdsa/secp384r1

   states that the client will accept ECDSA keys on the secp384r1 curve
   but not the secp256r1 curve and payload integrity assured with the
   Digest: mi-sha256 header field.

3.7.5.  Open Questions

   Is an Accept-Signature header useful enough to pay for itself?  If
   clients wind up sending it on most requests, that may cost more than
   the cost of sending Signatures unconditionally.  On the other hand,
   it gives servers an indication of which kinds of signatures are
   supported, which can help us upgrade the ecosystem in the future.

   Is Accept-Signature the right spelling, or do we want to imitate
   Want-Digest (Section 4.3.1 of [RFC3230]) instead?

   Do I have the right structure for the identifiers indicating feature
   support?

4.  Cross-origin trust

   To determine whether to trust a cross-origin exchange, the client
   takes a Signature header field (Section 3.1) and the exchange's

   *  requestUrl, a byte sequence that can be parsed into the exchange's
      effective request URI (Section 5.5 of [RFC7230]),

   *  responseHeaders, a byte sequence holding the canonical
      serialization (Section 3.4) of the CBOR representation
      (Section 3.2) of the exchange's response metadata and headers, and

   *  payload, a stream of bytes constituting the exchange's payload
      body (Section 3.3 of [RFC7230]).

   The client MUST parse the Signature header into a list of signatures
   according to the instructions in Section 3.5, and run the following
   algorithm for each signature, stopping at the first one that returns
   "valid".  If any signature returns "valid", return "valid".
   Otherwise, return "invalid".

   1.  If the signature's "validity-url" parameter (Section 3.1) is not
       same-origin (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/
       origin.html#same-origin) with requestUrl, return "invalid".

   2.  Use Section 3.5 to determine the signature's validity for
       requestUrl, responseHeaders, and payload, getting certificate-
       chain back.  If this returned "invalid" or didn't return a
       certificate chain, return "invalid".

   3.  Let response be the response metadata and headers parsed out of
       responseHeaders.

   4.  If Section 3 of [RFC7234] forbids a shared cache from storing
       response, return "invalid".

   5.  If response's headers contain an uncached header field, as
       defined in Section 4.1, return "invalid".

   6.  Let authority be the host component of requestUrl.

   7.  Validate the certificate-chain using the following substeps.  If
       any of them fail, re-run Section 3.5 once over the signature with
       the forceFetch flag set, and restart from step 2.  If a substep
       fails again, return "invalid".

       1.  Use certificate-chain to validate that its first entry, main-
           certificate is trusted as authority's server certificate
           ([RFC5280] and other undocumented conventions).  Let path be
           the path that was used from the main-certificate to a trusted
           root, including the main-certificate but excluding the root.

       2.  Validate that main-certificate has the CanSignHttpExchanges
           extension (Section 4.2).

       3.  Validate that main-certificate has an ocsp property
           (Section 3.3) with a valid OCSP response whose lifetime
           (nextUpdate - thisUpdate) is less than 7 days ([RFC6960]).
           Note that this does not check for revocation of intermediate
           certificates, and clients SHOULD implement another mechanism
           for that.

       4.  Validate that valid SCTs from trusted logs are available from
           any of:

           *  The SignedCertificateTimestampList in main-certificate's
              sct property (Section 3.3),

           *  An OCSP extension in the OCSP response in main-
              certificate's ocsp property, or

           *  An X.509 extension in the certificate in main-
              certificate's cert property,

           as described by Section 3.3 of [RFC6962].

   8.  Return "valid".

4.1.  Uncached header fields

   Hop-by-hop and other uncached headers MUST NOT appear in a signed
   exchange.  These will eventually be listed in
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-cache], but for now they're listed here:

   *  Hop-by-hop header fields listed in the Connection header field
      (Section 6.1 of [RFC7230]).

   *  Header fields listed in the no-cache response directive in the
      Cache-Control header field (Section 5.2.2.2 of [RFC7234]).

   *  Header fields defined as hop-by-hop:

      -  Connection

      -  Keep-Alive

      -  Proxy-Connection

      -  Trailer

      -  Transfer-Encoding

      -  Upgrade

   *  Stateful headers as defined below.

4.1.1.  Stateful header fields

   As described in Section 6.1, a publisher can cause problems if they
   sign an exchange that includes private information.  There's no way
   for a client to be sure an exchange does or does not include private
   information, but header fields that store or convey stored state in
   the client are a good sign.

   A stateful response header field modifies state, including
   authentication status, in the client.  The HTTP cache is not
   considered part of this state.  These include but are not limited to:

   *  Authentication-Control, [RFC8053]

   *  Authentication-Info, [RFC7615]

   *  Clear-Site-Data, [W3C.WD-clear-site-data-20171130]

   *  Optional-WWW-Authenticate, [RFC8053]

   *  Proxy-Authenticate, [RFC7235]

   *  Proxy-Authentication-Info, [RFC7615]

   *  Public-Key-Pins, [RFC7469]

   *  Sec-WebSocket-Accept, [RFC6455]

   *  Set-Cookie, [RFC6265]

   *  Set-Cookie2, [RFC2965]

   *  SetProfile, [W3C.NOTE-OPS-OverHTTP]

   *  Strict-Transport-Security, [RFC6797]

   *  WWW-Authenticate, [RFC7235]

4.2.  Certificate Requirements

   We define a new X.509 extension, CanSignHttpExchanges to be used in
   the certificate when the certificate permits the usage of signed
   exchanges.  When this extension is not present the client MUST NOT
   accept a signature from the certificate as proof that a signed
   exchange is authoritative for a domain covered by the certificate.
   When it is present, the client MUST follow the validation procedure
   in Section 4.

      id-ce-canSignHttpExchanges OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }

      CanSignHttpExchanges ::= NULL

   Note that this extension contains an ASN.1 NULL (bytes 05 00) because
   some implementations have bugs with empty extensions.

   Leaf certificates without this extension need to be revoked if the
   private key is exposed to an unauthorized entity, but they generally
   don't need to be revoked if a signing oracle is exposed and then
   removed.

   CA certificates, by contrast, need to be revoked if an unauthorized
   entity is able to make even one unauthorized signature.

   Certificates with this extension MUST be revoked if an unauthorized
   entity is able to make even one unauthorized signature.

   Certificates with this extension MUST have a Validity Period no
   greater than 90 days.

   Conforming CAs MUST NOT mark this extension as critical.

   A conforming CA MUST NOT issue certificates with this extension
   unless, for each dNSName in the subjectAltName extension of the
   certificate to be issued:

   1.  An "issue" or "issuewild" CAA property ([RFC6844]) exists that
       authorizes the CA to issue the certificate; and

   2.  The "cansignhttpexchanges" parameter (Section 4.2.1) is present
       on the property and is equal to "yes"

   Clients MUST NOT accept certificates with this extension in TLS
   connections (Section 4.4.2.2 of [RFC8446]).

   RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THE REST OF THE PARAGRAPHS IN THIS SECTION

      id-ce-google OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 }
      id-ce-canSignHttpExchangesDraft OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-google 2 1 22 }

   Implementations of drafts of this specification MAY recognize the id-
   ce-canSignHttpExchangesDraft OID as identifying the
   CanSignHttpExchanges extension.  This OID might or might not be used
   as the final OID for the extension, so certificates including it
   might need to be reissued once the final RFC is published.

   Some certificates have already been issued with this extension and
   with validity periods longer than 90 days.  These certificates will
   not immediately be treated as invalid.  Instead:

   *  Clients MUST reject certificates with this extension that were
      issued after 2019-05-01 and have a Validity Period longer than 90
      days.

   *  After 2019-08-01, clients MUST reject all certificates with this
      extension that have a Validity Period longer than 90 days.

   The above requirements on CAs to limit the Validity Period and check
   for a CAA parameter are effective starting 2019-05-01.

4.2.1.  Extensions to the CAA Record: cansignhttpexchanges Parameter

   A CAA parameter "cansignhttpexchanges" is defined for the "issue" and
   "issuewild" properties defined by [RFC6844].  The value of this
   parameter, if specified, MUST be "yes".

5.  Transferring a signed exchange

   A signed exchange can be transferred in several ways, of which three
   are described here.

5.1.  Same-origin response

   The signature for a signed exchange can be included in a normal HTTP
   response.  Because different clients send different request header
   fields, clients don't know how the server's content negotiation
   algorithm works, and intermediate servers add response header fields,
   it can be impossible to have a signature for the exchange's exact
   request, content negotiation, and response.  Therefore, when a client
   calls the validation procedure in Section 3.5) to validate the
   Signature header field for an exchange represented as a normal HTTP
   request/response pair, it MUST pass:

   *  The Signature header field,

   *  The effective request URI (Section 5.5 of [RFC7230]) of the
      request,

   *  The serialized headers defined by Section 5.1.1, and

   *  The response's payload.

   If the client relies on signature validity for any aspect of its
   behavior, it MUST ignore any header fields that it didn't pass to the
   validation procedure.

   If the signed response includes a Variants header field, the client
   MUST use the cache behavior algorithm in Section 4 of
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-variants] to check that the signed response is an
   appropriate representation for the request the client is trying to
   fulfil.  If the response is not an appropriate representation, the
   client MUST treat the signature as invalid.

5.1.1.  Serialized headers for a same-origin response

   The serialized headers of an exchange represented as a normal HTTP
   request/response pair (Section 2.1 of [RFC7230] or Section 8.1 of
   [RFC7540]) are the canonical serialization (Section 3.4) of the CBOR
   representation (Section 3.2) of the response status code (Section 6
   of [RFC7231]) and the response header fields whose names are listed
   in that response's Signed-Headers header field (Section 5.1.2).  If a
   response header field name from Signed-Headers does not appear in the
   response's header fields, the exchange has no serialized headers.

   If the exchange's Signed-Headers header field is not present, doesn't
   parse as a Structured Header ([I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]) or
   doesn't follow the constraints on its value described in
   Section 5.1.2, the exchange has no serialized headers.

5.1.1.1.  Open Questions

   Do the serialized headers of an exchange need to include the Signed-
   Headers header field itself?

5.1.2.  The Signed-Headers Header

   The Signed-Headers header field identifies an ordered list of
   response header fields to include in a signature.  The request URL
   and response status are included unconditionally.  This allows a TLS-
   terminating intermediate to reorder headers without breaking the
   signature.  This _can_ also allow the intermediate to add headers
   that will be ignored by some higher-level protocols, but Section 3.5
   provides a hook to let other higher-level protocols reject such
   insecure headers.

   This header field appears once instead of being incorporated into the
   signatures' parameters because the signed header fields need to be
   consistent across all signatures of an exchange, to avoid forcing
   higher-level protocols to merge the header field lists of valid
   signatures.

   Signed-Headers is a Structured Header as defined by
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure].  Its value MUST be a list
   (Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]).  Its ABNF is:

   Signed-Headers = sh-list

   Each element of the Signed-Headers list must be a lowercase string
   (Section 3.8 of [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]) naming an HTTP
   response header field.  Pseudo-header field names (Section 8.1.2.1 of
   [RFC7540]) MUST NOT appear in this list.

   Higher-level protocols SHOULD place requirements on the minimum set
   of headers to include in the Signed-Headers header field.

5.2.  HTTP/2 extension for cross-origin Server Push

   To allow servers to Server-Push (Section 8.2 of [RFC7540]) signed
   exchanges (Section 3) signed by an authority for which the server is
   not authoritative (Section 9.1 of [RFC7230]), this section defines an
   HTTP/2 extension.

5.2.1.  Indicating support for cross-origin Server Push

   Clients that might accept signed Server Pushes with an authority for
   which the server is not authoritative indicate this using the HTTP/2
   SETTINGS parameter ENABLE_CROSS_ORIGIN_PUSH (0xSETTING-TBD).

   An ENABLE_CROSS_ORIGIN_PUSH value of 0 indicates that the client does
   not support cross-origin Push.  A value of 1 indicates that the
   client does support cross-origin Push.

   A client MUST NOT send a ENABLE_CROSS_ORIGIN_PUSH setting with a
   value other than 0 or 1 or a value of 0 after previously sending a
   value of 1.  If a server receives a value that violates these rules,
   it MUST treat it as a connection error (Section 5.4.1 of [RFC7540])
   of type PROTOCOL_ERROR.

   The use of a SETTINGS parameter to opt-in to an otherwise
   incompatible protocol change is a use of "Extending HTTP/2" defined
   by Section 5.5 of [RFC7540].  If a server were to send a cross-origin
   Push without first receiving a ENABLE_CROSS_ORIGIN_PUSH setting with
   the value of 1 it would be a protocol violation.

5.2.2.  NO_TRUSTED_EXCHANGE_SIGNATURE error code

   The signatures on a Pushed cross-origin exchange may be untrusted for
   several reasons, for example that the certificate could not be
   fetched, that the certificate does not chain to a trusted root, that
   the signature itself doesn't validate, that the signature is expired,
   etc.  This draft conflates all of these possible failures into one
   error code, NO_TRUSTED_EXCHANGE_SIGNATURE (0xERROR-TBD).

5.2.2.1.  Open Questions

   How fine-grained should this specification's error codes be?

5.2.3.  Validating a cross-origin Push

   If the client has set the ENABLE_CROSS_ORIGIN_PUSH setting to 1, the
   server MAY Push a signed exchange for which it is not authoritative,
   and the client MUST NOT treat a PUSH_PROMISE for which the server is
   not authoritative as a stream error (Section 5.4.2 of [RFC7540]) of
   type PROTOCOL_ERROR, as described in Section 8.2 of [RFC7540], unless
   there is another error as described below.

   Instead, the client MUST validate such a PUSH_PROMISE and its
   response against the following list:

   1.  If the PUSH_PROMISE includes any non-pseudo request header
       fields, the client MUST treat it as a stream error (Section 5.4.2
       of [RFC7540]) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR.

   2.  If the PUSH_PROMISE's method is not GET, the client MUST treat it
       as a stream error (Section 5.4.2 of [RFC7540]) of type
       PROTOCOL_ERROR.

   3.  Run the algorithm in Section 4 over:

       *  The Signature header field from the response.

       *  The effective request URI from the PUSH_PROMISE.

       *  The canonical serialization (Section 3.4) of the CBOR
          representation (Section 3.2) of the pushed response's status
          and its headers except for the Signature header field.

       *  The response's payload.

       If this returns "invalid", the client MUST treat the response as
       a stream error (Section 5.4.2 of [RFC7540]) of type
       NO_TRUSTED_EXCHANGE_SIGNATURE.  Otherwise, the client MUST treat
       the pushed response as if the server were authoritative for the
       PUSH_PROMISE's authority.

5.2.3.1.  Open Questions

   Is it right that "validity-url" is required to be same-origin with
   the exchange?  This allows the mitigation against downgrades in
   Section 6.3, but prohibits intermediates from providing a cache of
   the validity information.  We could do both with a list of URLs.

5.3.  application/signed-exchange format

   To allow signed exchanges to be the targets of <link rel=prefetch>
   tags, we define the application/signed-exchange content type that
   represents a signed HTTP exchange, including a request URL, response
   metadata and header fields, and a response payload.

   When served over HTTP, a response containing an application/signed-
   exchange payload MUST include at least the following response header
   fields, to reduce content sniffing vulnerabilities (Section 6.8):

   *  Content-Type: application/signed-exchange;v=_version_

   *  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff

   This content type consists of the concatenation of the following
   items:

   1.  8 bytes consisting of the ASCII characters "sxg1" followed by 4
       0x00 bytes, to serve as a file signature.  This is redundant with
       the MIME type, and recipients that receive both MUST check that
       they match and stop parsing if they don't.

       Note: RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS NOTE; The implementation of
       the final RFC MUST use this file signature, but implementations
       of drafts MUST NOT use it and MUST use another implementation-
       specific 8-byte string beginning with "sxg1-".

   2.  2 bytes storing a big-endian integer fallbackUrlLength.

   3.  fallbackUrlLength bytes holding a fallbackUrl, which MUST UTF-8
       decode to an absolute URL with a scheme of "https".

       Note: The byte location of the fallback URL is intended to remain
       invariant across versions of the application/signed-exchange
       format so that parsers encountering unknown versions can always
       find a URL to redirect to.

       Issue: Should this fallback information also include the method?

   4.  3 bytes storing a big-endian integer sigLength.  If this is
       larger than 16384 (16*1024), parsing MUST fail.

   5.  3 bytes storing a big-endian integer headerLength.  If this is
       larger than 524288 (512*1024), parsing MUST fail.

   6.  sigLength bytes holding the Signature header field's value
       (Section 3.1).

   7.  headerLength bytes holding signedHeaders, the canonical
       serialization (Section 3.4) of the CBOR representation of the
       response headers of the exchange represented by the application/
       signed-exchange resource (Section 3.2), excluding the Signature
       header field.

   8.  The payload body (Section 3.3 of [RFC7230]) of the exchange
       represented by the application/signed-exchange resource.

       Note that the use of the payload body here means that a Transfer-
       Encoding header field inside the application/signed-exchange
       header block has no effect.  A Transfer-Encoding header field on
       the outer HTTP response that transfers this resource still has
       its normal effect.

5.3.1.  Cross-origin trust in application/signed-exchange

   To determine whether to trust a cross-origin exchange stored in an
   application/signed-exchange resource, pass the Signature header
   field's value, fallbackUrl as the effective request URI,
   signedHeaders, and the payload body to the algorithm in Section 4.

5.3.2.  Example

   An example application/signed-exchange file representing a possible
   signed exchange with https://example.com/ (https://example.com/)
   follows, with lengths represented by descriptions in <>s, CBOR
   represented in the extended diagnostic format defined in Appendix G
   of [CDDL], and most of the Signature header field and payload elided
   with a ...:

   sxg1\0\0\0\0<2-byte length of the following url string>
   https://example.com/<3-byte length of the following header
   value><3-byte length of the encoding of the
   following map>sig1; sig=*...; integrity="digest/mi-sha256"; ...{
     ':status': '200',
     'content-type': 'text/html'
   }<!doctype html>\r\n<html>...

5.3.3.  Open Questions

   Should this be a CBOR format, or is the current mix of binary and
   CBOR better?

   Are the mime type, extension, and magic number right?

6.  Security considerations

6.1.  Over-signing

   If a publisher blindly signs all responses as their origin, they can
   cause at least two kinds of problems, described below.  To avoid
   this, publishers SHOULD design their systems to opt particular public
   content that doesn't depend on authentication status into signatures
   instead of signing by default.

   Signing systems SHOULD also incorporate the following mitigations to
   reduce the risk that private responses are signed:

   1.  Strip the Cookie request header field and other identifying
       information like client authentication and TLS session IDs from
       requests whose exchange is destined to be signed, before
       forwarding the request to a backend.

   2.  Only sign exchanges where the response includes a Cache-Control:
       public header.  Clients are not required to fail signature-
       checking for exchanges that omit this Cache-Control response
       header field to reduce the risk that naïve signing systems
       blindly add it.

6.1.1.  Session fixation

   Blind signing can sign responses that create session cookies or
   otherwise change state on the client to identify a particular
   session.  This breaks certain kinds of CSRF defense and can allow an
   attacker to force a user into the attacker's account, where the user
   might unintentionally save private information, like credit card
   numbers or addresses.

   This specification defends against cookie-based attacks by blocking
   the Set-Cookie response header, but it cannot prevent Javascript or
   other response content from changing state.

6.1.2.  Misleading content

   If a site signs private information, an attacker might set up their
   own account to show particular private information, forward that
   signed information to a victim, and use that victim's confusion in a
   more sophisticated attack.

   Stripping authentication information from requests before sending
   them to backends is likely to prevent the backend from showing
   attacker-specific information in the signed response.  It does not
   prevent the attacker from showing their victim a signed-out page when
   the victim is actually signed in, but while this is still misleading,
   it seems less likely to be useful to the attacker.

6.2.  Off-path attackers

   Relaxing the requirement to consult DNS when determining authority
   for an origin means that an attacker who possesses a valid
   certificate no longer needs to be on-path to redirect traffic to
   them; instead of modifying DNS or IP routing, they need only convince
   the user to visit another Web site in order to serve responses signed
   as the target.  This consideration and mitigations for it are shared
   by the combination of [RFC8336] and
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2-secondary-certs], and are discussed further
   in [I-D.bishop-httpbis-origin-fed-up].

6.2.1.  Mis-issued certificates

   If a CA mis-issues a certificate for a domain, this specification
   provides a way to detect the mis-issuance and mitigate harm within
   approximately two weeks.  Specifically, because all signed exchanges
   must include a SignedCertificateTimestampList ([RFC6962], a CT log
   has promised to publish the mis-issued certificate within that log's
   Maximum Merge Delay, 1 day for many logs.  The domain owner can then
   detect the mis-issued certificate and notify the CA to revoke it,
   which the [BRs], section 4.9.1.1, say they must do within another 5
   days.

   Once the mis-issued certificate is revoked, existing OCSP responses
   begin to expire.  The [BRs], section 4.9.10, require that OCSP
   responses have a maximum expiration time of 10 days, after which they
   can't be used to validate a certificate chain (Section 3.3).  This
   leads to a total compromised time of 16 days after a mis-issuance.

   However, CAs might future-date their OCSP responses, in which case
   the mitigation doesn't work.

   CAs are forbidden from future-dating their OCSP responses by the
   [BRs] section 4.9.9, "OCSP responses MUST conform to RFC6960 and/or
   RFC5019."  [RFC6960] includes, "The time at which the status was
   known to be correct SHALL be reflected in the thisUpdate field of the
   response.", and [RFC5019] includes, "When pre-producing OCSPResponse
   messages, the responder MUST set the thisUpdate, nextUpdate, and
   producedAt times as follows: thisUpdate: The time at which the status
   being indicated is known to be correct."

   However, if a CA violates the [BRs] to sign future-dated OCSP
   responses, attempts to keep the nonconformant OCSP responses private,
   but then leaks them, it could cause clients to trust a hostile signed
   exchange long after its certificate has been revoked.

   Clients could use systems like [CRLSets] and [OneCrl] to revoke the
   intermediate certificate that signed the future-dated OCSP responses.

6.2.2.  Stolen private keys

   If the private key for a CanSignHttpExchanges certificate is stolen,
   it can be used at scale until the certificate expires or is revoked,
   and unlike for a stolen key for a normal TLS-terminating certificate,
   the rightful owner can't detect the problem by watching for attacks
   on the DNS or routing infrastructure.

   This specification does not currently propose a way for the rightful
   owner to detect that their keys are being used by an attacker, after
   they've opted into the risk by requesting a CanSignHttpExchanges
   certificate in the first place.  Clients can fetch a signature's
   "validity-url" (Section 3.1) to help owners detect key compromise,
   but that compromises some of the privacy properties of this
   specification.

6.3.  Downgrades

   Signing a bad response can affect more users than simply serving a
   bad response, since a served response will only affect users who make
   a request while the bad version is live, while an attacker can
   forward a signed response until its signature expires.  Publishers
   should consider shorter signature expiration times than they use for
   cache expiration times.

   Clients MAY also check the "validity-url" (Section 3.1) of an
   exchange more often than the signature's expiration would require.
   Doing so for an exchange with an HTTPS request URI provides a TLS
   guarantee that the exchange isn't out of date (as long as
   Section 5.2.3.1 is resolved to keep the same-origin requirement).

6.4.  Signing oracles are permanent

   An attacker with temporary access to a signing oracle can sign "still
   valid" assertions with arbitrary timestamps and expiration times.  As
   a result, when a signing oracle is removed, the keys it provided
   access to MUST be revoked so that, even if the attacker used them to
   sign future-dated exchange validity assertions, the key's OCSP
   assertion will expire, causing the exchange as a whole to become
   untrusted.

6.5.  Unsigned headers

   The use of a single Signed-Headers header field prevents us from
   signing aspects of the request other than its effective request URI
   (Section 5.5 of [RFC7230]).  For example, if a publisher signs both
   Content-Encoding: br and Content-Encoding: gzip variants of a
   response, what's the impact if an attacker serves the brotli one for
   a request with Accept-Encoding: gzip?  This is mitigated by using
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-variants] instead of request headers to describe
   how the client should run content negotiation.

   The simple form of Signed-Headers also prevents us from signing less
   than the full request URL.  The SRI use case (Appendix A.3) may
   benefit from being able to leave the authority less constrained.

   Section 3.5 can succeed when some delivered headers aren't included
   in the signed set.  This accommodates current TLS-terminating
   intermediates and may be useful for SRI (Appendix A.3), but is risky
   for trusting cross-origin responses (Appendix A.1, Appendix A.2, and
   Appendix A.6).  Section 5.2 requires all headers to be included in
   the signature before trusting cross-origin pushed resources, at Ryan
   Sleevi's recommendation.

6.6.  application/signed-exchange

   Clients MUST NOT trust an effective request URI claimed by an
   application/signed-exchange resource (Section 5.3) without either
   ensuring the resource was transferred from a server that was
   authoritative (Section 9.1 of [RFC7230]) for that URI's origin, or
   calling the algorithm in Section 5.3.1 and getting "valid" back.

6.7.  Key re-use with TLS

   In general, key re-use across multiple protocols is a bad idea.

   Using an exchange-signing key in a TLS (or other directly-internet-
   facing) server increases the risk that an attacker can steal the
   private key, which will allow them to mint packages (similar to
   Section 6.4) until their theft is discovered.

   Using a TLS key in a CanSignHttpExchanges certificate makes it less
   likely that the server operator will discover key theft, due to the
   considerations in Section 6.2.

   This specification uses the CanSignHttpExchanges X.509 extension
   (Section 4.2) to discourage re-use of TLS keys to sign exchanges or
   vice-versa.

   We require that clients reject certificates with the
   CanSignHttpExchanges extension when making TLS connections to
   minimize the chance that servers will re-use keys like this.
   Ideally, we would make the extension critical so that even clients
   that don't understand it would reject such TLS connections, but this
   proved impossible because certificate-validating libraries ship on
   significantly different schedules from the clients that use them.

   Even once all clients reject these certificates in TLS connections,
   this will still just discourage and not prevent key re-use, since a
   server operator can unwisely request two different certificates with
   the same private key.

6.8.  Content sniffing

   While modern browsers tend to trust the Content-Type header sent with
   a resource, especially when accompanied by X-Content-Type-Options:
   nosniff, plugins will sometimes search for executable content buried
   inside a resource and execute it in the context of the origin that
   served the resource, leading to XSS vulnerabilities.  For example,
   some PDF reader plugins look for %PDF anywhere in the first 1kB and
   execute the code that follows it.

   The application/signed-exchange format (Section 5.3) includes a URL
   and response headers early in the format, which an attacker could use
   to cause these plugins to sniff a bad content type.

   To avoid vulnerabilities, in addition to the response header
   requirements in Section 5.3, servers are advised to only serve an
   application/signed-exchange resource (SXG) from a domain if it would
   also be safe for that domain to serve the SXG's content directly, and
   to follow at least one of the following strategies:

   1.  Only serve signed exchanges from dedicated domains that don't
       have access to sensitive cookies or user storage.

   2.  Generate signed exchanges "offline", that is, in response to a
       trusted author submitting content or existing signatures reaching
       a certain age, rather than in response to untrusted-reader
       queries.

   3.  Do all of:

       1.  If the SXG's fallback URL (Section 5.3) is derived from the
           request URL, percent-encode
           (https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#percent-encode) ([URL]) any
           bytes that are greater than 0x7E or are not URL code points
           (https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#url-code-points) ([URL]) in the
           fallback URL . It is particularly important to make sure no
           unescaped nulls (0x00) or angle brackets (0x3C and 0x3E)
           appear.

       2.  Do not reflect request header fields into the set of response
           headers.

   There are still a few binary length fields that an attacker may
   influence to contain sensitive bytes, but they're always followed by
   lowercase alphabetic strings from a small set of possibilities, which
   reduces the chance that a client will sniff them as indicating a
   particular content type.

   To encourage servers to include the X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
   header field, clients SHOULD reject signed exchanges served without
   it.

7.  Privacy considerations

7.1.  Visibility of resource requests

   Normally, when a client follows a link from https://source.example/
   page.html to https://publisher.example/page.html, publisher.example
   learns that the client is interested in the resource. source.example
   also has several ways of discovering that the client has clicked the
   link, including the use of Javascript to record the click or having
   the link point to a URL that serves a 302 redirect to the real
   target.

   If publisher.example signs page.html into page.sxg,
   distributor.example serves it as
   https://distributor.example/publisher/page.sxg, and the client
   fetches it from there, then distributor.example learns that the
   client is interested, and if the client executes some Javascript on
   the page or makes subresource requests, that could also report the
   client's interest back to publisher.example.

   To prevent network operators other than distributor.example or
   publisher.example from learning which exchanges were read, clients
   SHOULD only load exchanges fetched over a transport that's protected
   from eavesdroppers.  This can be difficult to determine when the
   exchange is being loaded from local disk, but when the client itself
   requested the exchange over a network it SHOULD require TLS
   ([RFC8446]) or a successor transport layer, and MUST NOT accept
   exchanges transferred over plain HTTP without TLS.

   If source.example and distributor.example are controlled by the same
   entity, no extra information escapes here.  If they are run by
   different entities, a similar amount of information escapes as if
   source.example had implemented its click tracking by outsourcing to a
   service like https://bit.ly/ (https://bit.ly/).

   There has been discussion of allowing a publisher to restrict the set
   of distributors that can host its signed content.  If that's added,
   then the privacy situation becomes more similar to the situation with
   CDNs, where a publisher chooses a CDN to serve their content, and the
   CDN learns about all requests for that content.  Here the publisher
   would choose one or more distributors, and the distributor(s) would
   learn about requests for the content.

   For non-executable resource types, a signed response can improve the
   privacy situation by hiding the client's interest from the original
   publisher.

7.2.  User ID transfer

   If a request for https://distributor.example/publisher/page.sxg comes
   with the source's or distributor's user ID for the user, either
   because it's sent with the distributor's cookies or because the
   source stashes an encoded user ID into either the request's path or a
   subdomain, the distributor has a few ways to pass that user ID on to
   the publisher that signed the page:

   1.  If the distributor has the publisher's signing keys, it can sign
       a new page with its user ID directly embedded.

   2.  Otherwise, the publisher can sign lots of copies of their
       package, and the distributor can choose a particular copy to send
       a subset of the bits in its user ID to the publisher on each
       click, which will eventually transfer the whole thing.

   To prevent this, the request for a signed exchange needs to omit
   credentials and block them from appearing in the URL in the same way
   it would block them from appearing in a cross-origin URL.  We're
   exploring ways the link can mark the request so user agents can take
   the right counter-measures.

8.  IANA considerations

   TODO: possibly register the validity-url format.

8.1.  Signature Header Field Registration

   This section registers the Signature header field in the "Permanent
   Message Header Field Names" registry ([RFC3864]).

   Header field name: Signature

   Applicable protocol: http

   Status: standard

   Author/Change controller: IETF

   Specification document(s): Section 3.1 of this document

8.2.  Accept-Signature Header Field Registration

   This section registers the Accept-Signature header field in the
   "Permanent Message Header Field Names" registry ([RFC3864]).

   Header field name: Accept-Signature

   Applicable protocol: http

   Status: standard

   Author/Change controller: IETF

   Specification document(s): Section 3.7 of this document

8.3.  Signed-Headers Header Field Registration

   This section registers the Signed-Headers header field in the
   "Permanent Message Header Field Names" registry ([RFC3864]).

   Header field name: Signed-Headers

   Applicable protocol: http

   Status: standard

   Author/Change controller: IETF

   Specification document(s): Section 5.1.2 of this document

8.4.  HTTP/2 Settings

   This section establishes an entry for the HTTP/2 Settings Registry
   that was established by Section 11.3 of [RFC7540]

   Name: ENABLE_CROSS_ORIGIN_PUSH

   Code: 0xSETTING-TBD

   Initial Value: 0

   Specification: This document

8.5.  HTTP/2 Error code

   This section establishes an entry for the HTTP/2 Error Code Registry
   that was established by Section 11.4 of [RFC7540]

   Name: NO_TRUSTED_EXCHANGE_SIGNATURE

   Code: 0xERROR-TBD

   Description: The client does not trust the signature for a cross-
   origin Pushed signed exchange.

   Specification: This document

8.6.  Internet Media Type application/signed-exchange

   IANA is requested to register the MIME media type
   ([IANA.media-types]) for signed exchanges, application/signed-
   exchange, as follows:

   Type name: application

   Subtype name: signed-exchange

   Required parameters:

   *  v: A string denoting the version of the file format.  ([RFC5234]
      ABNF: version = DIGIT/%x61-7A) The version defined in this
      specification is 1.  When used with the Accept header field
      (Section 5.3.2 of [RFC7231]), this parameter can be a comma
      (,)-separated list of version strings.  ([RFC5234] ABNF: version-
      list = version *( "," version )) The server is then expected to
      reply with a resource using a particular version from that list.

      Note: RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS NOTE; Implementations of
      drafts of this specification MUST NOT use simple integers to
      describe their versions, and MUST instead define implementation-
      specific strings to identify which draft is implemented.  The
      newest version of
      [I-D.yasskin-httpbis-origin-signed-exchanges-impl] describes the
      meaning of one such string.

   Optional parameters: N/A

   Encoding considerations: binary

   Security considerations: see Section 6.6

   Interoperability considerations: N/A

   Published specification: This specification (see Section 5.3).

   Applications that use this media type: N/A

   Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

   Additional information:

   Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

   Magic number(s): 73 78 67 31 00

   File extension(s): .sxg

   Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

   Person and email address to contact for further information: See
   Authors' Addresses section.

   Intended usage: COMMON

   Restrictions on usage: N/A

   Author: See Authors' Addresses section.

   Change controller: IESG

   Provisional registration?  Yes

8.7.  Internet Media Type application/cert-chain+cbor

   IANA is requested to register the MIME media type
   ([IANA.media-types]) for CBOR-format certificate chains, application/
   cert-chain+cbor, as follows:

   Type name: application

   Subtype name: cert-chain+cbor

   Required parameters: N/A

   Optional parameters: N/A

   Encoding considerations: binary

   Security considerations: N/A

   Interoperability considerations: N/A

   Published specification: This specification (see Section 3.3).

   Applications that use this media type: N/A

   Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

   Additional information:

   Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

   Magic number(s): 1*9(??) 67 F0 9F 93 9C E2 9B 93

   File extension(s): N/A

   Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

   Person and email address to contact for further information: See
   Authors' Addresses section.

   Intended usage: COMMON

   Restrictions on usage: N/A

   Author: See Authors' Addresses section.

   Change controller: IESG

   Provisional registration?  Yes

8.8.  The cansignhttpexchanges CAA Parameter

   There are no IANA considerations for this parameter.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [CDDL]     Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
              Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
              Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
              JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
              June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.

   [FETCH]    WHATWG, "Fetch", April 2024,
              <https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/>.

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure]
              Nottingham, M. and P. Kamp, "Structured Field Values for
              HTTP", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              httpbis-header-structure-19, 3 June 2020,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-
              header-structure-19>.

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-variants]
              Nottingham, M., "HTTP Representation Variants", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-httpbis-variants-06,
              3 November 2019, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-httpbis-variants-06>.

   [I-D.thomson-http-mice]
              Thomson, M. and J. Yasskin, "Merkle Integrity Content
              Encoding", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              thomson-http-mice-03, 13 August 2018,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-thomson-http-
              mice-03>.

   [IANA.media-types]
              IANA, "Media Types",
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.

   [POSIX]    IEEE and The Open Group, "The Open Group Base
              Specifications Issue 7", name IEEE, value 1003.1-2008,
              2016 Edition, 2016,
              <http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/
              basedefs/>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3230]  Mogul, J. and A. Van Hoff, "Instance Digests in HTTP",
              RFC 3230, DOI 10.17487/RFC3230, January 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3230>.

   [RFC3864]  Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
              Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3864>.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5234>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6844]  Hallam-Baker, P. and R. Stradling, "DNS Certification
              Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record", RFC 6844,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6844, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6844>.

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960>.

   [RFC6962]  Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
              Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6962>.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
              October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7049>.

   [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7230>.

   [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7231>.

   [RFC7234]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
              RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7234>.

   [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7540>.

   [RFC8032]  Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
              Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

   [URL]      WHATWG, "URL", April 2024, <https://url.spec.whatwg.org/>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [BRs]      CA/Browser Forum, "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance
              and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates", 10
              December 2018,
              <https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-documents/>.

   [CRLSets]  Langley, A., "Revocation checking and Chrome's CRL", 5
              February 2012,
              <https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/02/05/crlsets.html>.

   [I-D.bishop-httpbis-origin-fed-up]
              Bishop, M. and E. Nygren, "DNS Security with HTTP/2
              ORIGIN", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bishop-
              httpbis-origin-fed-up-00, 8 January 2019,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bishop-
              httpbis-origin-fed-up-00>.

   [I-D.burke-content-signature]
              Burke, B., "HTTP Header for digital signatures", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-burke-content-signature-
              00, 7 March 2011, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-burke-content-signature-00>.

   [I-D.cavage-http-signatures]
              Cavage, M. and M. Sporny, "Signing HTTP Messages", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-cavage-http-signatures-12,
              21 October 2019, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-cavage-http-signatures-12>.

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-cache]
              Fielding, R. T., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
              Caching", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              httpbis-cache-19, 12 September 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-
              cache-19>.

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2-secondary-certs]
              Bishop, M., Sullivan, N., and M. Thomson, "Secondary
              Certificate Authentication in HTTP/2", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-secondary-certs-
              06, 14 May 2020, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-secondary-certs-06>.

   [I-D.thomson-http-content-signature]
              Thomson, M., "Content-Signature Header Field for HTTP",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-thomson-http-
              content-signature-00, 2 July 2015,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-thomson-http-
              content-signature-00>.

   [I-D.yasskin-httpbis-origin-signed-exchanges-impl]
              Yasskin, J. and K. Ueno, "Signed HTTP Exchanges
              Implementation Checkpoints", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-yasskin-httpbis-origin-signed-exchanges-impl-
              03, 25 July 2019, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-yasskin-httpbis-origin-signed-exchanges-impl-03>.

   [I-D.yasskin-wpack-use-cases]
              Yasskin, J., "Use Cases and Requirements for Web
              Packages", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              yasskin-wpack-use-cases-02, 13 April 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yasskin-
              wpack-use-cases-02>.

   [OneCrl]   Goodwin, M., "Revoking Intermediate Certificates:
              Introducing OneCRL", 3 March 2015,
              <https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/03/03/revoking-
              intermediate-certificates-introducing-onecrl/>.

   [RFC2965]  Kristol, D. and L. Montulli, "HTTP State Management
              Mechanism", RFC 2965, DOI 10.17487/RFC2965, October 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2965>.

   [RFC5019]  Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
              Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
              Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
              2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5019>.

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6066>.

   [RFC6265]  Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6265>.

   [RFC6454]  Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6454>.

   [RFC6455]  Fette, I. and A. Melnikov, "The WebSocket Protocol",
              RFC 6455, DOI 10.17487/RFC6455, December 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6455>.

   [RFC6797]  Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
              Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6797, November 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797>.

   [RFC7235]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7235>.

   [RFC7469]  Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning
              Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469, April
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7469>.

   [RFC7615]  Reschke, J., "HTTP Authentication-Info and Proxy-
              Authentication-Info Response Header Fields", RFC 7615,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7615, September 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7615>.

   [RFC8017]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
              "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
              RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017>.

   [RFC8053]  Oiwa, Y., Watanabe, H., Takagi, H., Maeda, K., Hayashi,
              T., and Y. Ioku, "HTTP Authentication Extensions for
              Interactive Clients", RFC 8053, DOI 10.17487/RFC8053,
              January 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8053>.

   [RFC8336]  Nottingham, M. and E. Nygren, "The ORIGIN HTTP/2 Frame",
              RFC 8336, DOI 10.17487/RFC8336, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8336>.

   [SRI]      Akhawe, D., Ed., Marier, F., Ed., Braun, F., Ed., and J.
              Weinberger, Ed., "Subresource Integrity", W3C REC REC-SRI-
              20160623, W3C REC-SRI-20160623, 23 June 2016,
              <https://www.w3.org/TR/2016/REC-SRI-20160623/>.

   [W3C.NOTE-OPS-OverHTTP]
              Converse, D., Ed., Metral, M., Ed., Myers, M., Ed.,
              Hensley, P., Ed., and U. Shardanand, Ed., "Implementation
              of OPS Over HTTP", W3C NOTE NOTE-OPS-OverHTTP, W3C NOTE-
              OPS-OverHTTP, 2 June 1997,
              <http://www.w3.org/TR/NOTE-OPS-OverHTTP>.

   [W3C.WD-clear-site-data-20171130]
              West, M., Ed., "Clear Site Data", W3C WD WD-clear-site-
              data-20171130, W3C WD-clear-site-data-20171130, 30
              November 2017,
              <https://www.w3.org/TR/2017/WD-clear-site-data-20171130/>.

Appendix A.  Use cases

A.1.  PUSHed subresources

   To reduce round trips, a server might use HTTP/2 Push (Section 8.2 of
   [RFC7540]) to inject a subresource from another server into the
   client's cache.  If anything about the subresource is expired or
   can't be verified, the client would fetch it from the original
   server.

   For example, if https://example.com/index.html includes

   <script src="https://jquery.com/jquery-1.2.3.min.js">

   Then to avoid the need to look up and connect to jquery.com in the
   critical path, example.com might push that resource signed by
   jquery.com.

A.2.  Explicit use of a content distributor for subresources

   In order to speed up loading but still maintain control over its
   content, an HTML page in a particular origin O.com could tell clients
   to load its subresources from an intermediate content distributor
   that's not authoritative, but require that those resources be signed
   by O.com so that the distributor couldn't modify the resources.  This
   is more constrained than the common CDN case where O.com has a CNAME
   granting the CDN the right to serve arbitrary content as O.com.

   <img logicalsrc="https://O.com/img.png"
        physicalsrc="https://distributor.com/O.com/img.png">

   To make it easier to configure the right distributor for a given
   request, computation of the physicalsrc could be encapsulated in a
   custom element:

   <dist-img src="https://O.com/img.png"></dist-img>

   where the <dist-img> implementation generates an appropriate <img>
   based on, for example, a <meta name="dist-base"> tag elsewhere in the
   page.  However, this has the downside that the preloader
   (https://calendar.perfplanet.com/2013/big-bad-preloader/) can no
   longer see the physical source to download it.  The resulting delay
   might cancel out the benefit of using a distributor.

   This could be used for some of the same purposes as SRI
   (Appendix A.3).

   To implement this with the current proposal, the distributor would
   respond to the physical request to https://distributor.com/O.com/
   img.png with first a signed PUSH_PROMISE for https://O.com/img.png
   and then a redirect to https://O.com/img.png.

A.3.  Subresource Integrity

   The W3C WebAppSec group is investigating using signatures
   (https://github.com/mikewest/signature-based-sri) in [SRI].  They
   need a way to transmit the signature with the response, which this
   proposal provides.

   Their needs are simpler than most other use cases in that the
   integrity="ed25519-[public-key]" attribute and CSP-based ways of
   expressing a public key don't need that key to be wrapped into a
   certificate.

   The "ed25519key" signature parameter supports this simpler way of
   attaching a key.

   The current proposal for signature-based SRI describes signing only
   the content of a resource, while this specification requires them to
   sign the request URI as well.  This issue is tracked in
   https://github.com/mikewest/signature-based-sri/issues/5
   (https://github.com/mikewest/signature-based-sri/issues/5).  The
   details of what they need to sign will affect whether and how they
   can use this proposal.

A.4.  Binary Transparency

   So-called "Binary Transparency" may eventually allow users to verify
   that a program they've been delivered is one that's available to the
   public, and not a specially-built version intended to attack just
   them.  Binary transparency systems don't exist yet, but they're
   likely to work similarly to the successful Certificate Transparency
   logs described by [RFC6962].

   Certificate Transparency depends on Signed Certificate Timestamps
   that prove a log contained a particular certificate at a particular
   time.  To build the same thing for Binary Transparency logs
   containing HTTP resources or full websites, we'll need a way to
   provide signatures of those resources, which signed exchanges
   provides.

A.5.  Static Analysis

   Native app stores like the Apple App Store
   (https://www.apple.com/ios/app-store/) and the Android Play Store
   (https://play.google.com/store) grant their contents powerful
   abilities, which they attempt to make safe by analyzing the
   applications before offering them to people.  The web has no
   equivalent way for people to wait to run an update of a web
   application until a trusted authority has vouched for it.

   While full application analysis probably needs to wait until the
   authority can sign bundles of exchanges, authorities may be able to
   guarantee certain properties by just checking a top-level resource
   and its [SRI]-constrained sub-resources.

A.6.  Offline websites

   Fully-offline websites can be represented as bundles of signed
   exchanges, although an optimization to reduce the number of signature
   verifications may be needed.  Work on this is in progress in the
   https://github.com/WICG/webpackage (https://github.com/WICG/
   webpackage) repository.

Appendix B.  Requirements

B.1.  Proof of origin

   To verify that a thing came from a particular origin, for use in the
   same context as a TLS connection, we need someone to vouch for the
   signing key with as much verification as the signing keys used in
   TLS.  The obvious way to do this is to re-use the web PKI and CA
   ecosystem.

B.1.1.  Certificate constraints

   If we re-use existing TLS server certificates, we incur the risks
   that:

   1.  TLS server certificates must be accessible from online servers,
       so they're easier to steal or use as signing oracles than an
       offline key.  An exchange's signing key doesn't need to be
       online.

   2.  A server using an origin-trusted key for one purpose (e.g.  TLS)
       might accidentally sign something that looks like an exchange, or
       vice versa.

   These risks are considered too high, so we define a new X.509
   certificate extension in Section 4.2 that requires CAs to issue new
   certificates for this purpose.  We expect at least one low-cost CA to
   be willing to sign certificates with this extension.

B.1.2.  Signature constraints

   In order to prevent an attacker who can convince the server to sign
   some resource from causing those signed bytes to be interpreted as
   something else the new X.509 extension here is forbidden from being
   used in TLS servers.  If Section 4.2 changes to allow re-use in TLS
   servers, we would need to:

   1.  Avoid key types that are used for non-TLS protocols whose output
       could be confused with a signature.  That may be just the
       rsaEncryption OID from [RFC8017].

   2.  Use the same format as TLS's signatures, specified in
       Section 4.4.3 of [RFC8446], with a context string that's specific
       to this use.

   The specification also needs to define which signing algorithm to
   use.  It currently specifies that as a function from the key type,
   instead of allowing attacker-controlled data to specify it.

B.1.3.  Retrieving the certificate

   The client needs to be able to find the certificate vouching for the
   signing key, a chain from that certificate to a trusted root, and
   possibly other trust information like SCTs ([RFC6962]).  One approach
   would be to include the certificate and its chain in the signature
   metadata itself, but this wastes bytes when the same certificate is
   used for multiple HTTP responses.  If we decide to put the signature
   in an HTTP header, certificates are also unusually large for that
   context.

   Another option is to pass a URL that the client can fetch to retrieve
   the certificate and chain.  To avoid extra round trips in fetching
   that URL, it could be bundled (Appendix A.6) with the signed content
   or PUSHed (Appendix A.1) with it.  The risks from the
   client_certificate_url extension (Section 11.3 of [RFC6066]) don't
   seem to apply here, since an attacker who can get a client to load an
   exchange and fetch the certificates it references, can also get the
   client to perform those fetches by loading other HTML.

   To avoid using an unintended certificate with the same public key as
   the intended one, the content of the leaf certificate or the chain
   should be included in the signed data, like TLS does (Section 4.4.3
   of [RFC8446]).

B.2.  How much to sign

   The previous [I-D.thomson-http-content-signature] and
   [I-D.burke-content-signature] schemes signed just the content, while
   ([I-D.cavage-http-signatures] could also sign the response headers
   and the request method and path.  However, the same path, response
   headers, and content may mean something very different when retrieved
   from a different server.  Section 5.1.1 currently includes the whole
   request URL in the signature, but it's possible we need a more
   flexible scheme to allow some higher-level protocols to accept a
   less-signed URL.

   Servers might want to sign other request headers in order to capture
   their effects on content negotiation.  However, there's no standard
   algorithm to check that a client's actual request headers match
   request headers sent by a server.  The most promising attempt at this
   is [I-D.ietf-httpbis-variants], which encodes the content negotiation
   algorithm into the Variants and Variant-Key response headers.  The
   proposal here (Section 3) assumes that is in use and doesn't sign
   request headers.

B.2.1.  Conveying the signed headers

   HTTP headers are traditionally munged by proxies, making it
   impossible to guarantee that the client will see the same sequence of
   bytes as the publisher published.  In the HTTPS world, we have more
   end-to-end header integrity, but it's still likely that there are
   enough TLS-terminating proxies that the publisher's signatures would
   tend to break before getting to the client.

   There's no way in current HTTP for the response to a client-initiated
   request (Section 8.1 of [RFC7540]) to convey the request headers it
   expected to respond to, but we sidestep that by conveying content
   negotiation information in response headers, per
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-variants].

   Since proxies are unlikely to modify unknown content types, we can
   wrap the original exchange into an application/signed-exchange format
   (Section 5.3) and include the Cache-Control: no-transform header when
   sending it.

   To reduce the likelihood of accidental modification by proxies, the
   application/signed-exchange format includes a file signature that
   doesn't collide with other known signatures.

   To help the PUSHed subresources use case (Appendix A.1), we might
   also want to extend the PUSH_PROMISE frame type to include a
   signature, and that could tell intermediates not to change the
   ensuing headers.

B.3.  Response lifespan

   A normal HTTPS response is authoritative only for one client, for as
   long as its cache headers say it should live.  A signed exchange can
   be re-used for many clients, and if it was generated while a server
   was compromised, it can continue compromising clients even if their
   requests happen after the server recovers.  This signing scheme needs
   to mitigate that risk.

B.3.1.  Certificate revocation

   Certificates are mis-issued and private keys are stolen, and in
   response clients need to be able to stop trusting these certificates
   as promptly as possible.  Online revocation checks don't work
   (https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/02/05/crlsets.html), so the
   industry has moved to pushed revocation lists and stapled OCSP
   responses [RFC6066].

   Pushed revocation lists work as-is to block trust in the certificate
   signing an exchange, but the signatures need an explicit strategy to
   staple OCSP responses.  One option is to extend the certificate
   download (Appendix B.1.3) to include the OCSP response too, perhaps
   in the TLS 1.3 CertificateEntry (https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/
   draft-ietf-tls-tls13.html#ocsp-and-sct) format.

B.3.2.  Response downgrade attacks

   The signed content in a response might be vulnerable to attacks, such
   as XSS, or might simply be discovered to be incorrect after
   publication.  Once the author fixes those vulnerabilities or
   mistakes, clients should stop trusting the old signed content in a
   reasonable amount of time.  Similar to certificate revocation, I
   expect the best option to be stapled "this version is still valid"
   assertions with short expiration times.

   These assertions could be structured as:

   1.  A signed minimum version number or timestamp for a set of request
       headers: This requires that signed responses need to include a
       version number or timestamp, but allows a server to provide a
       single signature covering all valid versions.

   2.  A replacement for the whole exchange's signature.  This requires
       the publisher to separately re-sign each valid version and
       requires each version to include a different update URL, but
       allows intermediates to serve less data.  This is the approach
       taken in Section 3.

   3.  A replacement for the exchange's signature and an update for the
       embedded expires and related cache-control HTTP headers
       [RFC7234].  This naturally extends publishers' intuitions about
       cache expiration and the existing cache revalidation behavior to
       signed exchanges.  This is sketched and its downsides explored in
       Appendix C.

   The signature also needs to include instructions to intermediates for
   how to fetch updated validity assertions.

B.4.  Low implementation complexity

   Simpler implementations are, all things equal, less likely to include
   bugs.  This section describes decisions that were made in the rest of
   the specification to reduce complexity.

B.4.1.  Limited choices

   In general, we're trying to eliminate unnecessary choices in the
   specification.  For example, instead of requiring clients to support
   two methods for verifying payload integrity, we only require one.

B.4.2.  Bounded-buffering integrity checking

   Clients can be designed with a more-trusted network layer that
   decides how to trust resources and then provides those resources to
   less-trusted rendering processes along with handles to the storage
   and other resources they're allowed to access.  If the network layer
   can enforce that it only operates on chunks of data up to a certain
   size, it can avoid the complexity of spooling large files to disk.

   To allow the network layer to verify signed exchanges using a bounded
   amount of memory, Section 5.3 requires the signature to be less than
   16kB and the headers to be less than 512kB, and Section 3.5 requires
   that the MI record size be less than 16kB.  This allows the network
   layer to validate a bounded chunk at a time, and pass that chunk on
   to a renderer, and then forget about that chunk before processing the
   next one.

   The Digest header field from [RFC3230] requires the network layer to
   buffer the entire response body, so it's disallowed.

Appendix C.  Determining validity using cache control

   This draft could expire signature validity using the normal HTTP
   cache control headers ([RFC7234]) instead of embedding an expiration
   date in the signature itself.  This section specifies how that would
   work, and describes why I haven't chosen that option.

   The signatures in the Signature header field (Section 3.1) would no
   longer contain "date" or "expires" fields.

   The validity-checking algorithm (Section 3.5) would initialize date
   from the resource's Date header field (Section 7.1.1.2 of [RFC7231])
   and initialize expires from either the Expires header field
   (Section 5.3 of [RFC7234]) or the Cache-Control header field's max-
   age directive (Section 5.2.2.8 of [RFC7234]) (added to date),
   whichever is present, preferring max-age (or failing) if both are
   present.

   Validity updates (Section 3.6) would include a list of replacement
   response header fields.  For each header field name in this list, the
   client would remove matching header fields from the stored exchange's
   response header fields.  Then the client would append the replacement
   header fields to the stored exchange's response header fields.

C.1.  Example of updating cache control

   For example, given a stored exchange of:

   GET  / HTTP/1.1
   Host: example.com
   Accept: */*

   HTTP/1.1 200
   Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2017 10:00:00 UTC
   Content-Type: text/html
   Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 10:00:00 UTC
   Expires: Sun, 26 Nov 2017 10:00:00 UTC

   <!doctype html>
   <html>
   ...

   And an update listing the following headers:

   Expires: Fri, 1 Dec 2017 10:00:00 UTC
   Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2017 10:00:00 UTC

   The resulting stored exchange would be:

   GET / HTTP/1.1
   Host: example.com
   Accept: */*

   HTTP/1.1 200
   Content-Type: text/html
   Expires: Fri, 1 Dec 2017 10:00:00 UTC
   Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2017 10:00:00 UTC

   <!doctype html>
   <html>
   ...

C.2.  Downsides of updating cache control

   In an exchange with multiple signatures, using cache control to
   expire signatures forces all signatures to initially live for the
   same period.  Worse, the update from one signature's "validity-url"
   might not match the update for another signature.  Clients would need
   to maintain a current set of headers for each signature, and then
   decide which set to use when actually parsing the resource itself.

   This need to store and reconcile multiple sets of headers for a
   single signed exchange argues for embedding a signature's lifetime
   into the signature.

Appendix D.  Change Log

   RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS SECTION.

   draft-09

   *  No change

   draft-08

   *  Improve the privacy considerations.

   draft-07

   *  Provisionally register application/signed-exchange and
      application/cert-chain+cbor.

   draft-06

   *  Add a security consideration for future-dated OCSP responses and
      for stolen private keys.

   *  Define a CAA parameter to opt into certificate issuance.

   *  Limit certificate lifetimes to 90 days.

   *  UTF-8 decode the fallback URL.

   draft-05

   *  Define absolute URLs, and limit the schemes each instance can use.

   *  Fill in TBD size limits.

   *  Update to mice-03 including the Digest header.

   *  Refer to draft-yasskin-httpbis-origin-signed-exchanges-impl for
      draft version numbers.

   *  Require exchange's response to be cachable by a shared cache.

   *  Define the "integrity" field of the Signature header to include
      subfields of the main integrity-protecting header, including the
      digest algorithm.

   *  Put a fallback URL at the beginning of the application/signed-
      exchange format, which replaces the ':url' key from the CBOR
      representation of the exchange's request and response metadata and
      headers.

   *  Remove the rest of the request headers from the signed data, in
      favor of representing content negotiation with the Variants
      response header.

   *  Make the signed message format a concatenation of byte sequences,
      which helps implementations avoid re-serializing the exchange's
      request and response metadata and headers.

   *  Explicitly check the response payload's integrity instead of
      assuming the client did it elsewhere in processing the response.

   *  Reject uncached header fields.

   *  Update to draft-ietf-httpbis-header-structure-09.

   *  Update to the final TLS 1.3 RFC.

   draft-04

   *  Update to draft-ietf-httpbis-header-structure-06.

   *  Replace the application/http-exchange+cbor format with a simpler
      application/signed-exchange format that:

      -  Doesn't require a streaming CBOR parser parse it from a network
         stream.

      -  Doesn't allow request payloads or response trailers, which
         don't fit into the signature model.

      -  Allows checking the signature before parsing the exchange
         headers.

   *  Require absolute URLs.

   *  Make all identifiers in headers lower-case, as required by
      Structured Headers.

   *  Switch back to the TLS 1.3 signature format.

   *  Include the version and draft number in the signature context
      string.

   *  Remove support for integrity protection using the Digest header
      field.

   *  Limit the record size in the mi-sha256 encoding.

   *  Forbid RSA keys, and only require clients to support secp256r1
      keys.

   *  Add a test OID for the CanSignHttpExchanges X.509 extension.

   draft-03

   *  Allow each method of transferring an exchange to define which
      headers are signed, have the cross-origin methods use all headers,
      and remove the allResponseHeaders flag.

   *  Describe footguns around signing private content, and block
      certain headers to make it less likely.

   *  Define a CBOR structure to hold the certificate chain instead of
      re-using the TLS1.3 message.  The TLS 1.3 parser fails on
      unexpected extensions while this format should ignore them, and
      apparently TLS implementations don't expose their message parsers
      enough to allow passing a message to a certificate verifier.

   *  Require an X.509 extension for the signing certificate.

   draft-02

   *  Signatures identify a header (e.g.  Digest or MI) to guard the
      payload's integrity instead of directly signing over the payload.

   *  The validityUrl is signed.

   *  Use CBOR maps where appropriate, and define how they're
      canonicalized.

   *  Remove the update.url field from signature validity updates, in
      favor of just re-fetching the original request URL.

   *  Define an HTTP/2 extension to use a setting to enable cross-origin
      Server Push.

   *  Define an Accept-Signature header to negotiate whether to send
      Signatures and which ones.

   *  Define an application/http-exchange+cbor format to fetch signed
      exchanges without HTTP/2 Push.

   *  2 new use cases.

Appendix E.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Andrew Ayer, Devin Mullins, Ilari Liusvaara, John Wilander,
   Justin Schuh, Mark Nottingham, Mike Bishop, Ryan Sleevi, and Yoav
   Weiss for comments that improved this draft.

Author's Address

   Jeffrey Yasskin
   Google
   Email: jyasskin@chromium.org